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I.   INTRODUCTION
2 
 
China’s economic performance since the onset of economic reforms in 1978 has been 
remarkable; the per capita real GDP growth has averaged 8¼ percent and social indicators 
have improved markedly. However, the rapid pace of growth of the national economy 
masks substantial differences in the growth rate and level of per capita incomes across 
different provinces in China. The issue of uneven regional development has recently moved 
to the top of the policy agenda in order to share more broadly the benefits of economic 
reforms. 
 
This paper seeks to provide answers to the following three questions:  
 
•  Are the relatively poor provinces in China catching up with the rich? 
•  If they are, what are the characteristics of the catch up process? 
•  On current trends, what will the provincial income distribution look like in the future? 
In the empirical growth literature, these questions have been broadly classified as those 
relating to the study of convergence of income levels among economic units—countries or 
provinces within a particular country. However, the term convergence has been used to 
mean several different phenomena in the literature. In this chapter, convergence will be 
defined as the phenomenon of income levels in poorer provinces catching up in relative 
terms with those in the rich.  
The subject of income disparities within China has, of late, been the focus of several studies. 
Generally speaking, three main results emerge from these studies: 
 
•  If one looks at only per capita incomes of provinces, then in the post–1978 period there 
is little evidence that the initially poorer provinces have, on average, grown at a faster 
pace than their richer counterparts.
3 However, if per capita incomes of provinces are 
adjusted for differences in economic structure, economic policies, demographics, and 
geography, then there is evidence that, on average, the initially poorer provinces have 
indeed grown faster than those that were initially richer.
4 
                                                   
2Throughout this paper, references to China are to the Mainland and the term “provinces” refers to the set of 
28 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities listed in Table1. 
3In the growth literature, the phenomenon of initially poorer economies—measured in terms of their per 
capita incomes—growing faster than those that are initially richer is referred to as absolute (or unconditional) 
beta-convergence.  
4This phenomenon is referred to as conditional beta-convergence.    - 4 - 
•  Forces of conditional convergence were stronger in the pre-1990 era—the early reform 
period, and weaker in the 1990s. 
•  The dispersion in relative incomes of the provinces fell in the early reform period and 
rose in the 1990s.
5  
However, virtually all these studies provide only a partial view of the convergence process. 
They tend to focus exclusively on the average (in the case of unconditional and conditional 
beta-convergence) and standard deviation (in the case of sigma-convergence) of the relative 
income distribution of provinces, and based on the behavior of these two statistics, draw 
inferences about whether relative income levels of China’s provinces are converging or not. 
Although these two statistics provide valuable insights into the convergence process, as 
shown in many studies—theoretical and empirical—inferences based solely on the behavior 
of the two statistics are incomplete. In particular, the answer to the question of whether or 
not the poor provinces are catching up with the rich, depends on how the shape of the 
entire provincial relative income distribution has changed over time, and not simply on the 
behavior of two statistics—the average and the dispersion—of the distribution. 
 
The approach taken in this chapter is to exploit more fully the information contained in the 
shape of the relative income distribution and the way in which it has changed over time. To 
do this, in the spirit of Quah (1997), kernel estimates of the relative income distribution of 
China’s provinces are computed and their intertemporal properties characterized. The 
results from this exercise suggest the following: 
 
•  Per capita incomes of the initially poor provinces are catching up with those in the 
initially richer provinces. 
•  However, this overall tendency masks significant differences across provinces. On the 
one hand, the coastal provinces are growing at a relatively faster pace than the rest, 
including the initially richer provinces. On the other hand, many of the initially poorer 
provinces, after improving their relative rankings in the 1980s, have been falling behind 
in the 1990s. The initially richer provinces have been losing their standing in the relative 
income ladder quite rapidly. 
•  As a result, the relative income distribution seems to be stratifying into a bimodal 
distribution; the coastal provinces gravitating towards one mode, and the remaining 
provinces toward the other.  
•  Economic structure and policies, in particular, the concentration of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and the openness of the province to external trade, have been 
significant factors in these distributional dynamics.  
                                                   
5The decline in the dispersion of relative income across a set of economies is referred to as sigma-convergence. 
   - 5 - 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section B summarizes the existing empirical evidence 
on convergence among China’s provinces. This is followed by the main section of the 
chapter, where kernel estimates of the relative income distribution and their intertemporal 
changes are discussed and inferences reported. Section D concludes with a discussion of 
some of the implications of these results.  
 
II.   CONVERGENCE: EVIDENCE FROM RECENT STUDIES 
 
A.   Economic Performance of China’s Provinces 
 
Economic performance has varied substantially across China’s provinces.
6 Between 1978 
and 1997, per capita incomes grew in all Chinese provinces in absolute terms, and both 
initially rich and initially poor provinces experienced a significant increase in living standards 
(Chart 1). However, the extent of improvement in living standards differed substantially 
among the provinces. While real GDP per capita has grown by at least 5 percent on average 
during the reform period, some provinces—notably those along the coast—have grown at 
more than twice that rate.
7 Indeed, the variation in economic performance has displayed 
                                                   
6This section draws on Husain (1998), Jian et al. (1996), and Dayal-Gulati and Husain (2000).  
7Some observers believe that China’s GDP growth rates are overstated by as much as 2 percentage points. 
This issue is not relevant to the present study, which focuses on relative provincial GDP levels and growth 
rates, under the assumption that there is no systematic tendency for growth in certain provinces to be 
overstated more than in others. 
Chart 1. China: Provincial Income Distribution, 1978-97
Between 1978 and 1997 all provinces in China grew in absolute terms
1997 per capita income
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some distinct geographical patterns. Coastal provinces have tended to outperform the 
central provinces, which in turn surpassed the western provinces. For example, coastal 
provinces like Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang each grew at an average annual rate of 
around 12 percent in real per capita terms during 1978–97, while central provinces like 
Hubei, Henan, and Jiangxi grew by about 9 percent. Western provinces like Gansu, Qinghai, 
and Ningxia grew by between 5 and 7 percent.  
 
Significant variation in relative economic performance over time is also a feature of the 
provincial data (Table 1 in the appendix). Shanghai and Guizhou were China’s richest and 
poorest provinces, respectively, in both 1978 and in 1997. However, there were 
considerable changes in rankings (in terms of level of real per capita GDP) among the other 
provinces between those two years. For instance, the coastal province of Zhejiang moved 
from rank 15 in 1978 to 5 in 1997, while the western province of Qinghai dropped from its 
rank 6 to 20 over the same period. More broadly, in 1978, the most affluent provinces 
tended to be in the northeast, but by 1989 some of the coastal provinces had joined the 
northeastern region as the most affluent in the country. By 1997, the coastal provinces 
were clearly the most affluent (apart from the metropolitan areas of Shanghai, Beijing, and 
Tianjin), followed by the northeastern region. 
 
B.   Convergence and Growth Regressions 
 
One of the key predictions of the neoclassical growth model is the convergence hypothesis, 
i.e., the tendency of poor countries/regions to catch up with richer countries/regions.
8 In 
the literature, the most common approach to studying such a phenomenon is to conduct a 
beta-convergence exercise, which amounts to verifying whether the neoclassical (standard 
Solow or augmented endogenous growth) model is a good description of a country’s 
development experience.
9 In this context, as noted, a distinction between absolute and 
conditional beta-convergence is typically made. If economies vary in their saving rates and 
initial capital stocks, then the neoclassical model predicts conditional convergence, a 
situation in which per capita incomes converge, conditional on each economy’s steady state.
 
10 That is, among economies that are similar in preferences, technologies, savings rates and 
other structural characteristics, the lower the initial levels of output per capita the higher 
the growth rates.  
                                                   
8More precisely, and as argued by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), the neoclassical model leads to conditional 
rather than absolute convergence (defined in footnotes 2 and 3). 
9Examples include Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Cashin and Sahay (1996), and Dayal-Gulati and Husain 
(2000). 
10Convergence in this case arises from the assumption of diminishing returns to capital. Since the rate of 
return on capital is lower in economies with more capital per worker, there are incentives for capital to flow 
from rich to poor economies, boosting growth in the latter relative to the former, and thus causing 
convergence.   - 7 - 
 
The methodology to test the hypothesis of beta-convergence commonly involves regressing 
per capita output growth during a given time interval on a constant, initial per capita 
income, and a set of conditioning variables. Empirical studies differ in terms of the 
conditioning variables included, but investment ratios, educational characteristics, 
population growth, and dummy variables for coastal effects have typically been used. The 
conditional convergence hypothesis predicts a statistically significant negative coefficient on 
initial income (holding the conditioning variables constant).  
 
In the case of China, several studies 
have shown that, in general, the 
relative dispersion of provincial per 
capita incomes fell in the 1980s, but 
rose subsequently. This observation 
suggests that the evolution of China’s 
regional income dynamics can be 
roughly divided into two time 
periods: 1978–89 and 1990–97, with 
the former period characterized by 
convergence and the latter by 
divergence, as measured by sigma-
convergence.  
 
A number of studies have also tested 
the beta-convergence hypothesis 
using Chinese provincial data. A selected survey of these studies is shown in Table 2, and 
their main findings are the following:  
 
•  Jian et  al. (1996) find that China’s regional disparities narrowed between 1978 and 1990, 
but that subsequently, the coastal and interior regions of China began to diverge, 
reflecting in part the special privileges given to the coastal regions. They explain the 
divergence in regional incomes by an increase in the variance between the coastal 
provinces and the interior provinces, rather than by an increase in the variance within 
either the coast or the interior. They conclud that, China is on a dual track, with a 
prosperous and fast growing coastal region and a poor interior growing at a lower rate.  
•  Chen and Fleisher (1996), using an augmented Solow growth model, find evidence that 
convergence was conditional on coastal location. Their result suggests that convergence 
is occurring within the coastal and inland regions but not between these regions.  
•  Raiser and Nunnenkamp (1997) find evidence in support of conditional income 
convergence among China’s provinces; however, they also show that the rate of 
convergence in the 1985–92 period is markedly slower than that for 1978–85.  
Study Convergence
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Table 2. China: Selected Tests of Convergence Hypothesis for China's Provinces  - 8 - 
•  Li et al. (1998), using the augmented Solow-Swan model, find support for the conditional 
convergence hypothesis, and estimate the convergence rate to be relatively high at 
4¾ percent per annum.
11 However, they also note an increase in income inequality 
after 1990, and point out that, while economic reforms in China have facilitated 
convergence of each province toward its steady state, reforms have also widened the 
gap between the steady states of different provinces. The authors also present evidence 
in support of unconditional convergence during the sample period, so that regional 
economies converge even though they have dissimilar  steady states.  
•  Dayal-Gulati and Husain (2000) show that regions are converging, but to different 
steady state levels of income. They find the pattern of FDI flows, as well as structural 
characteristics of the regions—including total investment, the concentration of SOEs, 
and bank loan-deposit ratios—are important factors determining growth and 
convergence.  
 
Using a representative set 
of conditioning variables 
used in the above studies, 
similar beta-convergence 
exercises were performed 
for the period 1978–97, and 
the sub-periods 1978–89 
and 1990–97. The results—
summarized in Table 3—
generally confirm those 







III.   DYNAMICS OF CONVERGENCE 
 
The results from the previous section, while useful, do not provide a complete picture 
about the shape of the relative income distribution or how it has evolved over the years. To 
do so, the kernels of the actual relative provincial incomes in different time periods are 
estimated so that their shapes and intertemporal dynamics can be studied. A kernel estimator 
of a set of observations—in this case the relative rankings of the provincial per capita 
                                                   
11In comparison, estimates of the rate of convergence for other economies center around 2 percent. See 
Mankiw, Romer, Weil (1992), for example.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent variable
Initial per capita income (in log) -1.24 -3.57 ** -2.49 *** -5.62 *** 2.77 * -1.56
Population growth -0.52 -2.01 0.3
Domestic investment-to-GDP 0.027 0.07 * 0.02
Foreign direct investment-to-GDP 0.14 0.27 *** 0.05
Government revenue-to-expenditure -0.001 0.003 -0.004
M2-to-GDP -0.007 -0.001 -0.014
Share of SOEs in industrial output -0.045 *** -0.02 -0.09 ***
Coastal dummy 1.83 *** 1.3 * 1.97 ***
 Adjusted R
2
0.03 0.79 0.09 0.61 0.02 0.84
Standard error of regression 3.03 0.8 1.48 0.97 2.48 1.01
Sources: Chinese authorities; and staff estimates.
Notes: * implies statistical significance at 10 percent level; ** implies statistical significance at 5 percent level;
             *** implies significance at 1 percent level. 
             
Table 3.  China: Provincial Growth Regressions, 1978-97
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real Per Capita GDP
1978-97 1978-89 1990-97
Coefficients  - 9 - 
income—is an estimated distribution function from which the observations are likely to 
have been drawn (for details, see Silverman (1986)). Mathematically, the kernel estimator f(x) 





















) (  
where,  
 
Xj = data 
N = number of data points 
h = window width/smoothing parameter
12 
K = kernel/weighting function (assumed to be the normal distribution in this paper) 
A.   Provincial Income Distribution 
 
The three panels in Chart 2 display the kernels of the provincial relative incomes 
in 1978, 1989, and 1997. In each panel, the kernel was estimated in the three steps.  
 
•  In the first step, in each year, the real per capita income of each of China’s 28 provinces 
was rescaled as a fraction of Shanghai’s per capita income,
13 
14 such that the range of the 
distribution is restricted to lie between 0 and 1. Since by construction, Shanghai’s 
relative income is always 1, it was also excluded from the sample.  
•  In the second step, for a suitably large number of points spanning the interval [0,1],
15 the 
relative frequency, i.e., the unconditional probability, with which each of these values 
could have occurred, was estimated. The probability of each point was computed as the 
weighted average of the distance of that point from the given relative incomes of all the 
27 provinces, with the weights drawn from a normal or Gaussian distribution centered 
at that point.  
 
                                                   
12The window width was chosen following the suggestion in Silverman (1986) to be given by 0.9AN
-1/5, where 
A=min(standard deviation, interquartile range/1.34). 
13The choice of Shanghai as the numeraire is arbitrary and has little impact on the analysis. 
14Note that Hainan and Tibet Autonomous Region were excluded from the sample since data on per capita 
income are not available before 1985. Data for Chongqing, which became a municipality in 1997, were 
included in the data for Sichuan.  
15For these exercises, the interval [0,1] was divided into equally spaced 50 sub-intervals.   - 10 - 
Chart 2. China: Relative Income Distribution Across Provinces, 1978-97
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•  In the third step, the relative frequencies of these points were filtered for noise using 
the procedure in Silverman 
(1986). The collection of the 
filtered relative frequencies 
formed the kernel of the 
relative provincial incomes in 
that year.
 The area of the 
distribution was normalized 
to 100.  
 
One interpretation of the kernel 
estimators is that, based on the 
actual growth experience of 
China’s provinces, they tell us 
how likely it is that per capita 
income, on average, was a certain 
fraction of Shanghai’s per capita 
income in a particular year. For 
example, in the first panel of 
Chart 2, in 1978 the 
unconditional probability that a 
province’s per capita income was 
1/5 of Shanghai’s was 14 percent. 
This probability declined to 
10 percent in 1989 and then rose 
to 12 percent in 1997 (the 
second and third panels).  
 




•  Most of the mass of the income distributions for all three periods remained below 
2/5 of Shanghai’s per capita income, indicating that throughout the last two decades of 
reform, on average, provincial per capita income was most likely to have been less than 
40 percent of Shanghai’s per capita income. 
                                                   
16In the remainder of this chapter the terms kernel and distribution will be used interchangeably. In the charts, 
the income distribution is referred to as the Gaussian kernel since the weights used were drawn from a 
Gaussian distribution. Weights drawn from a Epanechnikov distribution, which is the other frequently used 
weighting method, did not seem to make any material difference to the shape of the estimated kernels.   - 11 - 
•  In the early reform period, there was some decline in the mass of provinces in the first 
quintile of the distribution, partially offset by an increase in the second quintile. 
•  In the late reform period, the shift to the second quintile was reversed, as the 
proportion of provinces in the first quintile rose.  
These stylized facts are consistent 
with some of the results of the 
convergence exercises. It shows 
that there was tendency in the 
early reform period for 
unconditional beta-convergence, 
which disappears in the later 
reform period. It is also 
consistent with a decrease in the 
standard deviation of the 
provincial relative incomes in 
the 1980s, i.e., sigma-
convergence, followed by a rising 
trend in the 1990s.  
 
However, the relative income 
distributions tell us little about 
whether the poor provinces 
became richer or poorer in 
relative terms in the early and 
late reform periods. Chart 3 
provides various examples of 
movements of provinces over 
time that preserve the overall shape of the distributions in Chart 2, but reflect dramatically 
different growth dynamics. In particular, it is possible that a province at point A in 1978 (at 
1/5 of Shanghai’s per capita income), moved to point B in 1989 and then to point C in 1997. 
Alternatively, point A could have moved to point D in 1989, and then fallen back to point E 
in 1997. These examples suggest that an answer to the question requires carefully tracking 
the positions of each province in the relative income distributions in 1978, 1989, and 1997.  
 
B.   Growth Dynamics in China’s Provinces 
 
Chart 3. Examples of Distribution-Preserving Movements
























































0 1/5 2/5 3/5 4/5 1


















y  - 12 - 
This section focuses on the  
intradistribution dynamics among 
the Chinese provinces, displayed 
in Charts 4 and 5. In each panel, 
the kernel of the joint 
distribution of relative incomes in 
the initial and terminal years is 
shown. The horizontal axes 
measure the relative incomes in 
the initial and terminal years, 
while the vertical axis measures 
the frequency. The height of the 
distribution shows the frequency 
with which a particular growth 
experience occurred between the 
two time periods. Points of the 
distribution that lie along the 
north-south diagonal represent 
unchanged relative incomes, while 
points to the right (left) of the 
diagonal represent a rise (decline) 
in relative incomes between the 
two periods plotted.  
 
In the first panel of Chart 4, the 
kernel shows that the dominant 
experience among China’s 
provinces was that relative 
incomes were between 1/5 and 
2/5 of Shanghai’s income in 1978 
and remained in that interval 
in 1989; for a small number of 
provinces relative income was  
Chart 4. China: Distribution Dynamics in the Early and Late Reform Periods
Gaussian kernel of the joint distribution of provincial relative income. 
The area under the entire distribution is normalized to be 100.
The horizontal axes measure provincial per capita income  as a fraction of Shanghai's per capita income, 
while the vertical axis measures the relative frequency, in percent.
A movement to the right of the north-south diagonal indicates improvement in relative  income ranking, while
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higher in 1978, but remained around the same levels eleven years later. Put differently, 
based on China’s actual provincial growth experience during 1978–89, the probability that a 
province in the [1/5–2/5] interval in 1978 remained in that interval at the end of the period 
was fairly high, while that of reaching, say 3/5 and above of Shanghai’s income, was virtually 
zero.  
 
This picture of apparent immobility is, however, not entirely correct. Along the north-south 
diagonal of the panel, the entire distribution is skewed to the right. This implies that 
although most provinces remained in the second quintile between 1978 and 1989, many 
shifted closer to the upper end of the interval during the period. The same was true for 
those in the fourth quintile in 1978; they moved up into the fifth quintile in 1989. 
Consequently, in the early reform period, not only was there considerable intra-
distributional mobility across provinces, but the poor provinces did in fact become richer in 
relative terms.  
 
This trend seems to be have been somewhat reversed in the later reform period. The 
kernel of the joint-distribution between 1989 and 1997 shows a distinct left skew along the 
north-south diagonal at both the lower and upper ends of the range. This implies that while 
the provinces in the second quintile shifted toward the lower end of the interval, so did 
those in the upper quintiles. More interestingly, however, a set of provinces in the second 
quintile in 1989, broke out of that range to move into the third and fourth quintiles. Some 
of the relatively better-off provinces whose relative position worsened were Heilongjiang, 
Liaoning, Qinghai, Tianjin, and Beijing, while provinces like Guizhou, Yunnan, Gansu, and 
Shaanxi, which were already relatively poor, became poorer. The provinces that gained 
most in relative terms were the ones in the coastal region—Guandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
and Fujian. Thus, while the coastal provinces gained in rank, some of the relatively rich 
provinces and many of the low-income provinces fell behind.  
 
What do the intradistribution 
dynamics for the entire 
period 1978–97 look like? 
Chart 5 shows the kernel of the 
joint relative income 
distribution between 1978 
and 1997. The distribution has 
two distinct features; while a 
predominant part of the 
distribution is shifted to the left 
of the north-south diagonal, 
there is a significant mass 
skewed to the right. It would 
seem as if the coastal provinces 
are gravitating rightward and 
forming their own cluster, while 
Chart 5. China: Distribution Dynamics During 1978-97
Gaussian kernel of the joint distribution of provincial relative income. 
The area under the entire distribution is normalized to be 100.
The horizontal axes measure provincial per capita income  as a fraction of Shanghai's per capita income, 
while the vertical axis measures the relative frequency, in percent.
A movement to the right of the north-south diagonal indicates improvement in relative  income ranking, while























1978  - 14 - 
the remaining regions—both the relatively rich and poor—are gravitating to the left to form 
a separate cluster. In other words, there is an emerging tendency for the distribution to be 
stratified into a bimodal distribution.
 17 
 
These results provide somewhat firmer ground to answer the questions raised in the 
introduction.  
 
•  The relatively poor provinces are catching up 
with the rich, but this is occurring in a 
somewhat complex manner. Some of the coastal 
provinces, which were relatively poor at the 
beginning of the reform period, have been 
growing at a considerably faster pace than the 
erstwhile rich provinces of the rust belt, 
especially in the 1990s. As a result, the gap 
between the coastal provinces and the initially rich is closing in relative terms. On the 
other hand, the other initially poor provinces are falling behind in relative terms, such 
that the dispersion among these initially poor and rich provinces is also declining—the 
provinces seem to be 
clustering toward two 
separate relative 
income clubs.  
•  Furthermore, there 
has been considerable 
mobility in relative 
rankings. This raises a 
whole new set of 
questions that are 
explored in the next 
section. If labor and 
capital were relatively 
immobile in China, as 
suggested by 
conventional wisdom, 
what explains the 
intra-distribution 
churning? Is it the 
                                                   
17Quah (1997) termed this bimodality “twin peaks” in the context of cross-country growth experience. In that 
study, the twin peaks lay along the north-south diagonal implying little mobility in relative rankings. In the case 
of China’s provincial growth, the emergent  twin peaks would lie across the north-south diagonal, implying 
significant mobility in rankings. This is a specific example of what Baumol (1986) termed “ club convergence”. 













Non coastal provinces (LHS) Coastal Provinces
Gaussian kernel of the joint distribution of provincial relative income. 
The area under the entire distribution is normalized to be 100.
The horizontal axes measure provincial per capita income  as a fraction of Shanghai's per capita income, 
while the vertical axis measures the relative frequency, in percent.
 




















1978  - 15 - 
structure of these economies or is it due to different policies adopted by these 
provinces? The next section provides partial answers to these questions.  
•  To answer the question about the future shape of the regional income distribution, the 
relative income rankings based on the relative growth differentials among the provinces 
in the 1990s were projected to 2010. Chart 6 shows the kernel of the joint distribution 
of relative incomes in 1978 and that projected for 2010. As can be observed, the 
stratification into two peaks becomes more pronounced, underscoring the earlier 
conclusion about emerging club convergence. 
 
C.   Explaining Provincial Growth Dynamics 
 
The analysis so far has not made a distinction of the kind between conditional and 
unconditional beta-convergence. Recall that the distinction was based on the notion that 
different provinces could be converging to different steady states, depending on the specific 
features of the economic structure and economic policies, and thus, converging at different 
rates. This section focuses on the question whether the growth dynamics and inferences 
made in the previous section, which were based only on the growth experiences of the 
provinces and thus unconditional in nature, are affected by economic structure and policies. 
The methodology used to was the following: 
•  First, for each province “conditioned” growth rates for the periods 1979–89 and 1990–
97 were constructed using the fraction of the growth rate explained by the variables—
population growth rate; foreign direct investment-to-GDP ratio; domestic investment-
to-GDP ratio; government revenue-to-expenditure ratio; M2-to-GDP ratio; share of 
SOEs in industrial production; and the coastal dummy—in the regression equations 4 
and 6 in Table 3.
18 
•  Second, residual growth rates were computed by subtracting the conditioned growth 
rates from the realized growth rates. Using these residual growth rates, conditioned 
relative incomes for 1989 and 1997 were computed. 
•  Third, based on the actual relative incomes in 1978, and the conditioned relative 
incomes in 1989 and 1997, kernels of the conditioned joint distribution of relative 
incomes between 1978–89, 1989–97, and 1978–97 were computed. These are depicted 
in Charts 7 and 8. 
                                                   
18Except for population growth, all the other variables were chosen on the basis of results in Dayal-Gulati and 
Husain (2000).    - 16 - 
The noticeable feature of the conditioned distributions for 1978–89, 1989–97, and 1978–97 
(Charts 7 and 8), is that they are all skewed to the right of the north-south diagonal. 
Comparing the conditioned joint distributions with the unconditioned ones (Charts 4 and 
5), the following inferences can be drawn: 
 
•  For the period 1978–89, the skew in the unconditioned joint distribution is not very 
different from that in the conditioned distribution; thus, economic structure and policies 
had little influence on inter-regional convergence. 
•  However, for the 
period 1989–97, the 
conditioned distribution 
shows a more marked 
skew toward the right of 
the north-south diagonal 
than that in the 
unconditioned 
distribution. This 
underscores the strong 
presence of convergence 
forces after the influence 
of policies and economic 
structure has been 
filtered. Importantly, the 
coastal regions no longer 
show the previous strong 
shift to higher rankings. 
The absence of the 
marked shift was largely 
due to the strong 
explanatory power of the 
coastal dummy in the 
growth regression for the 
later reform period. As 
noted previously, the 
coastal dummy plays the 
role of a proxy for the 
external openness of the 
provinces, albeit a very 
weak one. This suggests 
that external trade was a 
strong factor behind the growth of the coastal provinces in the 1990s.  
               
Gaussian kernel of the joint distribution of provincial relative income. 
The area under the entire distribution is normalized to be 100.
The horizontal axes measure provincial per capita income  as a fraction of Shanghai's per capita income, 
while the vertical axis measures the relative frequency, in percent.
 













































1989  - 17 - 
•  For the period as a whole, the conditioned distribution shows an almost uniform 
tendency toward convergence. In contrast, the unconditioned distribution showed more 
complex dynamics, with an emerging tendency towards twin-peakedness. Consequently, 
it would appear that economic structure and policies of the provinces have played an 
important role in increasing stratification among China’s provinces.
19 
The variation in economic 
performance across 
provinces has been a 
function of the timing, 
sequencing, and targeting of 
economic reforms and the 
associated structural shifts. 
Whereas China’s pre–1978 
development strategy 
emphasized balance and 
equity, this gave way to the 
pursuit in the 1980s of the 
objective of rapid growth 
based on gradual and 
incremental reforms.
20 This 
new strategy shifted the 
focus of state investment 
from the interior to the 
coastal regions and granted 
the latter preferential 
treatment. Beginning in 1980, the coastal region was opened up to foreign investment 
through the creation of special economic zones and open cities. Combined with this 
region’s other advantages, such as a relatively high level of human capital and geographical 
location, this resulted in a sharp pickup in growth along China’s southern coast. The 
resulting narrowing gap between southern coastal provinces and eastern coastal provinces 
served to reduce regional disparities during the 1980s. As the government’s pro-coastal 
policy orientation strengthened further in the late 1980s, the interior provinces became 
increasingly cut-off and income disparities started to rise, causing the government to adjust 
its policies during the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991–95), and to increase support to the less 
developed regions in the central and western parts of China (Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996–
                                                   
19The major factors, however, are mainly structural since the coefficients of the structural variables in 
regressions 4 and 6 in Table 3 are statistically significant while those on the policy variables are not. 
20During the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981–85), a pro-coastal policy program was adopted, and this orientation 
became even more pronounced in the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986–90).The idea was that reforms should be 
conducted on an experimental basis in certain regions first. If such experiments were successful, their 
influence would eventually spread to other regions (see Wang and Hu (1999)). 
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2000)). More recently, the government has redoubled its efforts to reduce regional 
disparities.  
 
The northeastern provinces, including Liaoning and Heilongjiang, were initially the most 
affluent provinces,
21 reflecting large-scale investment in the industrial sector under central 
planning. As a result, on the eve of reforms, provinces with relatively large industrial sectors 
were the most affluent. However, the associated high concentration of SOEs in the eastern 
provinces subsequently became a drag on growth, with most of these provinces recording 
relatively low growth rates. 
 
Apart from the selective opening up in the 1980s, the other major area of reform in the 
post–1978 period was in the agricultural sector. A shift in agricultural production from the 
commune system to the household responsibility system led to a rapid increase in 
agricultural productivity, benefiting per capita incomes in those provinces where agriculture 
was a relatively high share of provincial GDP (certain central and western provinces).
22 In 
addition, rural areas benefited from the emergence of township and village enterprises 
(TVEs), which operated outside of the central plan and absorbed excess labor from 
agriculture. These reforms—which took place for the most part between 1979 and 1985—
resulted in relatively strong per capita income growth in those provinces where agriculture 
was the dominant sector and where there was a high concentration of TVEs, contributing 
to a reduction in regional income inequalities during the 1980s.  
 
IV.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Conventional convergence studies, which use regression techniques to determine the 
existence of convergence, do not provide a complete answer to the question of whether 
poor provinces in China are catching up with richer provinces. A better approach is to 
examine the entire distribution of relative provincial incomes, as this sheds light on the 
intertemporal dynamics that lie behind China’s development and growth experience. The 
distributional dynamics suggest that China’s poor provinces are catching up with the rich. 
The catch-up, however, is occurring in a complex manner, with the gap between the coastal 
provinces and the initially rich provinces closing in relative terms. Moreover, the initially 
poor provinces, as well as the previously richer provinces, are both falling behind in relative 
terms (the latter at a faster pace). Thus, provinces in China appear to be clustering toward 
relative income clubs of their own, which is causing the distribution of relative incomes to 
become stratified into a bimodal distribution. An extrapolation of current growth trends 
to 2010 reveals an even more pronounced bimodal stratification. Finally, this chapter finds 
                                                   
21Excluding the even more affluent but largely metropolitan areas of Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin. 
22The household responsibility system allowed peasant households to operate their own plots and to have 
greater freedom to choose which crops to plant.    - 19 - 
that economic structure and policies have played an important role in bringing about 
increasing stratification among China’s provinces. 
 
China’s prospective entry into the WTO could accelerate the process of stratification. The 
coastal provinces and, to a lesser extent, those provinces’ immediate hinterland, could 
benefit from the expected growth in international trade. On the other hand, the relatively 
poor provinces, particularly those dependent on agriculture, could see a further slowdown 
in the growth of per capita incomes as prices for agricultural products fall. Moreover, the 
provinces with a heavy concentration of SOEs may see their former affluence erode even 
further as pressures mount to restructure the state enterprises.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996–2000) addressed regional disparities, 
and, since then, the Chinese authorities have intensified their efforts to narrow the income 
gaps among China’s provinces. Indeed, developing the central and western region is a 
cornerstone of the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–05), and a “Develop the West” initiative has 
recently been launched. Under this plan, efforts are focused on infrastructural investment, 
technological upgrading, and training and education,
23 while emphasis is also being given to  
projects that protect and restore the environment. In addition, efforts are being made to 
equalize preferential tax policies between coastal and inland areas. With regard to the fiscal 
system more generally, while discretionary fiscal transfers have been used in the past to 
help offset large social safety net needs in poorer regions, concerns about regional 
disparities may necessitate a review of the entire system of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations at some point in the future.  
 
                                                   
23About two-thirds of the expenditure under the fiscal stimulus packages in 1998 and 1999 has been targeted 
at the central and western provinces.   - 20 - 
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Province  1978  Province  1989  Province  1997 
1 Shanghai  1.00  1 Shanghai  1.00  1 Shanghai  1.00 
2 Beijing  0.70  2 Beijing  0.79  2 Beijing  0.69 
3 Tianjin  0.57  3 Tianjin  0.57  3 Tianjin  0.53 
4 Liaoning  0.41  4 Liaoning  0.46  4 Guangdong  0.41 
5 Heilongjiang  0.35  5 Guangdong  0.35  5 Zhejiang  0.41 
6 Qinghai  0.29  6 Heilongjiang  0.33  6 Jiangsu  0.37 
7 Guangdong  0.23  7 Zhejiang  0.32  7 Liaoning  0.36 
8 Jilin  0.22  8 Jiangsu  0.32  8 Fujian  0.35 
9 Shanxi  0.22  9 Shandong  0.28  9 Shandong  0.31 
10 Jiangsu  0.22  10 Xinjiang  0.28  10 Heilongjiang  0.25 
11 Hebei  0.21  11 Jilin  0.27  11 Hebei  0.24 
12 Shandong  0.21  12 Fujian  0.27  12 Jilin  0.23 
13 Xinjiang  0.21  13 Qinghai  0.25  13 Hubei  0.22 
14 Ningxia  0.21  14 Hubei  0.24  14 Xinjiang  0.22 
15 Zhejiang  0.20  15 Shanxi  0.23  15 Shanxi  0.19 
16 Hubei  0.19  16 Hebei  0.23  16 Inner Mongolia  0.18 
17 Hunan  0.19  17 Ningxia  0.23  17 Anhui  0.17 
18 Fujian  0.18  18 Inner Mongolia  0.22  18 Guangxi  0.17 
19 Inner Mongolia  0.18  19 Shaanxi  0.20  19 Hunan  0.16 
20 Guangxi  0.18  20 Yunnan  0.19  20 Qinghai  0.16 
21 Gansu  0.16  21 Hunan  0.19  21 Henan  0.16 
22 Yunnan  0.16  22 Anhui  0.18  22 Ningxia  0.16 
23 Shaanxi  0.16  23 Henan  0.17  23 Jiangxi  0.16 
24 Sichuan  0.15  24 Sichuan  0.17  24 Yunnan  0.15 
25 Anhui  0.15  25 Gansu  0.17  25 Sichuan  0.15 
26 Jiangxi  0.15  26 Jiangxi  0.17  26 Shaanxi  0.14 
27 Henan  0.14  27 Guangxi  0.16  27 Gansu  0.13 
28 Guizhou  0.11  28 Guizhou  0.13  28 Guizhou  0.09 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics. 
Note: Hainan and Tibet Autonomous Region were excluded since data on per capita income are not 
available before 1985. Data for Chongqing, which became a municipality in 1997, are 
included in the data for Sichuan.  
Table 1. China: Real Per Capita GDP by Province Relative to Shanghai, 1978-97  